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Introduction
Conflicts between parents and children concerning values have
long been fought. This is exemplified by the religious deprogramming
controversy. In recent years children have been breaking with their tra-
dition and joining unorthodox religious cults.1 Parents, concerned for
their children's welfare, have been physically abducting them and sub-
jecting them to religious deprogramming. This process forces the chil-
dren to relinquish their membership and repudiate their beliefs.
The first section of this note will discuss recruiting techniques and
alleged brainwashing practices applied by the cults. The second will
analyze and discuss the current self-help method of deprogramming
and the cases involving its legality. The third section will recommend
and discuss the feasibility of using both the guardianship statutes and
the thirteenth amendment's slavery prohibitions as possible solutions to
the problems of self-help.
I. Cults, Recruiting and Brainwashing
Religious cults have been under substantial attack by the public
recently, due mainly to recruiting techniques' and what has been per-
ceived as their members' zombie-like appearance.8 The underlying issue
is the cult's alleged use of brainwashing.
Brainwashing is a term coined to describe the mind-altering tech-
1. This note concerns religious cults such as: The Children of God, The Unifica-
tion Church, The Church of Armageddon, The International Society of Krishna Con-
sciousness, and others.
2. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Rice, The Pull of Sun Moon, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1976, Sunday
Magazine, at 8 ("Those who observe Monies closely often notice a glassy spaced-out
look, which, combined with their everlasting smiles, makes them resemble tripped out
freaks." Id. at 23.).
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niques practiced by Koreans with prisoners of war during the Korean
Conflict. The fact that this mind-alteration does occur has yet to gain
full acceptance in the United States. This was most evident in both the
Manson Family' and Patty Hearst5 trials. In both cases, the defense
contended and the court heard evidence that brainwashing would miti-
gate liability. The fact that this evidence was accepted indicates that
the courts will give some credence to brainwashing even though guilty
verdicts were returned in both.
Those who acknowledge the detriments of brainwashing find it
reprehensible since it destroys the mind's ability to function under its
own will, or to its full capacity.6
The criteria established to identify brainwashing include: isolating
the person to be brainwashed, severing ties with his past, depriving him
of sleep, fatiguing his body, changing his diet, playing on the member's
feelings of guilt and shame, changing language, keeping the cults' cen-
tral beliefs secret from the recruit, and others.7
The cults seem to employ most, if not all of these methods. There
is evidence indicating that the cults isolate new recruits and do not
4. In the Tate-Labianca murders committed by the Manson Family, Charles
"Tex" Watson, tried separately from the rest of the Family, pled not guilty by reason
of insanity since "he was simply an unthinking zombie programmed by Charles Man-
son." V. BUGLIOSI with C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER 627 (1974). In defense of this
claim "Tex" called eight psychiatrists, but the District Attorney's cross-examination
showed "Tex" was in "complete command of his mental faculties." Id. at 626-27.
5. See, Mathews & Cook, Patty's Defense, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1976, at 20;
Fraker, Kasindorf & Camper, What Is Brainwashing?, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1976, at
31; Mathews, Kasindorf & Cook, Patty On Trial, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1976, at 24.
6. See, e.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion
Under The First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977) ("The recruit's impaired
intellectual functioning appears to reflect a loss of many I.Q. points. . . ." Id. at 14).
7. See, W. SARGANT, BATTLE FOR THE MIND, A PHYSIOLOGY OF CONVERSION
AND BRAINWASHING (1957) (for an application of Sargant's factors to the Children of
God, see REPORT SUBMITTED BY CHARITY FRAUDS BUREAU, FINAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHILDREN OF GOD , To HON. LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1974) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].);
R. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF
BRAINWASHING IN CHINA (1961) (for an application of Lifton's factors to today's reli-
gious cults, see C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 172-76 (1977); E.
SCHEIN WITH I. SCHNEIER & C. BARKER, COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961).
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permit them to contact family or friends.' They are often denied the
opportunity to read a newspaper.' If parents attempt to see their child,
he is often hidden from them.10 Many cults have their members take on
new biblical names to further sever ties with the past."1
Most cults also rely heavily on fatigue and sleep deprivation dur-
ing both the recruiting and membership periods. Days start before
dawn and run till after midnight for the recruit. They are filled with
such activities as lectures on theology, calisthenics, sports, chanting and
prayer.12 For the fully-inducted member, it is long days of recruiting
and fundraising. 3
8. See, Rice, supra note 3, at 23 ("There is neither time nor opportunity for
phoning or writing relatives or friends."). See also, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 42
("Generally, [Children of God] elders intercepted mail addressed to members who ei-
ther never received it or received it in censored form, with portions deleted .... mem-
bers were required to leave all outgoing mail unsealed for censorship and posting...
."1).
9. One ex-moonie said that "I asked about getting a newspaper and they told me,
'No. Newspapers are full of negativity and are not useful in our life.' I thought that
was ridiculous and I said so, but I didn't argue, because it wouldn't have mattered." C.
STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 170.
10. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 22-23, where one ex-member of
the Children of God testified:
They then persuaded me to hide in another loft next door ... I heard
my parents come up and I heard them scream and everything and the cops
came-and I stayed there until my parents left the building . . .I heard
my mother asking Abram and Ruth where I was and Abram denied by
presence at the Children of God and stated I left the Children of God and
they did not know where I was.
Id.
11. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 24 ("The use of bible names also
obviously serves as a new identity for a [Children of God] member, which reinforces
the concept of severing all ties, both familial and societal.").
12. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 3, at 23. "An exhausting and rigid schedule leaves
little time for sleep and none for private reflection. Recruits get a daily dose of six to
eight hours of mind-numbing theology based on Moon's 'Divine Principle'." Id. Accord,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 38. A former member of the Children of God testified:
"I was so constantly kept busy the entire time . . . that I didn't have time to think
about anything else but what they had planned for me .... from the time I got up in the
morning until I went to bed at night, which was usually very late." Id.
13. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 3, at 23-24 ("[Moonies] put in grueling dawn-
dusk days recruiting and fundraising."); Kennedy & Kennedy, The Devil's Work,
PENTHOUSE, March, 1982, at 53 ("I worked alone-no salary either-and spent eigh-
3851Religious Deprogramming
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There is also evidence that the cults play on members' feelings of
guilt and shame. One ex-member of the Church of Armageddon said
she felt "[]ike the world's most rotten person. They told me the
sores all over my body (scabies caused by mites that bury them-
selves under the skin and lay eggs there) were caused by my own
sinfulness and would go away only when I began to lead a more
obedient pure life.""'
This play on guilt and shame drives some members to self-mutila-
tion.15 It is alleged one member "committed suicide because he didn't
consider himself worthy of the Moon cause.'"
Many cults change words and phrases in the recruits' language
and quote the bible out of context, making the cultist spend many in-
tensive study hours.17 In addition, they often keep the central beliefs of
their doctrine secret from the recruit to further confuse him.' 8
The fact that the cults make use of these methods leading to
brainwashing does little to explain how this phenomena occurs. Dissat-
isfied with previous studies in this respect, Flo Conway and Jim Siegel-
man, after an extensive four year investigation,' 9 sought to explain the
physiological effects these factors have on the brain when practiced by
the cults. The authors explain that the brain is an information storage
device which operates holographically. A holograph is a mathematical
teen hours a day, seven days a week and 365 days a year to get donations for the
Unification Church." Id. at 52-53.).
14. C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 109.
15. Delgado, supra note 6, at 16.
16. 122 CONG. REc. H1390, 1392 (1976) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (Repre-
sentative Wilson read an article previously run in the National Enquirer by Jan Good-
win, Multimillionaire Minister Woos Children From Their Families To Beg For Him
On The Streets, which quoted New York psychiatrist Dr. Ernest Giovanoli).
17. For example, in the Children of God, "stress is placed upon intensive memo-
rization of selected biblical verses, taken out of context." FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,
at 29. See also, C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 175 ("Each religious cult has
created an entire new language and teaches adherents meaning of words in their
language.").
18. See, e.g., C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 174-75 ("Implicit in this
concept is the idea that the cult's resulting laws of morality are absolute, and therefore
must be followed automatically." Id. at 174.).
19. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING (1978).
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model to store three-dimensional information in two dimensions photo-
graphically, from which the three-dimensional image can be
reconstructed.20
. The original theorist of the holographic model of the brain, neurol-
ogist Karl Pribram, has explained that under this model "we can store
things in our brains in terms of various frequencies of information.
Then we can read out the information in either linear or spatial fash-
ion.... space and time are not in the brain; they are read out of it."2 1
Conway and Siegelman show that experience can alter the brain's
basic hologram,22 that which determines how information is read out.
Thus, the interplay of the aforementioned criteria which establish
brainwashing will cause the brain to have a holographic crisis. At this
exact moment, which Conway and Siegelman call the moment of snap-
ping,23 there will be a "sudden drastic alteration of an individual's en-
tire personality" 24 and, "if he remains in an alien setting with little or
no connection to his former life . . . his personality will almost cer-
tainly be refashioned in the image of his new surroundings, and his
awareness . . . with that of people around him."25 "In the wake of
snapping the individual's ability to question and to act suffer dramatic
impairment. At the same time, he becomes almost wholly vulnerable to
suggestion and command." 2
This vulnerability to suggestion has been taken to such extremes
as killing. 27 Who among us can forget Jim Jones leading 900 zombie-
20. Id. at 118. See also PRIBRAM, LANGUAGES OF THE BRAIN: EXPERIMENTAL
PARADOXES AND PRINCIPLES IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGY (1971).
21. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 121 (1978) (reporting interview
with Karl Pribram).
22. Id. at 125-33. This experience comes to the brain in terms of "information".
"Deprived of information, the brain ceases functioning normally; starved to extremes it
goes altogether haywire." Id. at 127.
23. Id. at 134.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 136-37.
26. Id. at 155.
27. An ex-member of the Children of God said:
I was told by an older member that if my leaders told me to kill someone,
I would have to kill someone, but I hesitated on that and asked them why?
... He said 'Well, we are not under the law and we are responsible only
to our leaders, who are responsible to God for us'.
387 1
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eyed people to commit suicide in Guyana.28
Many libertarians believe that allowing people to put themselves
at the command of others is a price we must pay for living in a free
society.29 Critics of the cults may also believe this in principle, but
counter that it is the unconsensual nature of the cults' recruiting, and
subsequent brainwashing, which they find so offensive.30
Cult recruiters are told to "watch on the streets and campuses for
the lonely"31 who are considered more prone to suggestion. The re-
cruiter will then act as a loving friend 2 just willing to listen, often even
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 33.
It was also claimed that the Tate and Labianca murders committed by the Man-
son Family were a result of Manson's brainwashing the members of his family. See V.
BUGLIOSI, supra note 4.
28. See, e.g., Mathews with Harper, Fuller & Nater, The Cult of Death, NEWS-
WEEK, Dec. 4, 1978, at 38; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1978, at Al ("authorities put the
final count of the number of dead at the Jonestown Commune at 909").
29. See, e.g., Kelly, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, Civ. LIB. REV.,
July-Aug. 1977, at 23 ("A part of religious liberty is the right of all of us to make
what seem to others to be foolish choices, to be hoodwinked or to be exploited for the
sake of what seems to us to be the truth." Id. at 31.).
30. This requirement of consent is clearly in line with traditional notions of lib-
erty. As libertarian John Stuart Mill has written:
this then is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the
most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,
moral or theological .... Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes
and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of
doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without im-
pediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm
them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse or
wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining
being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
J. S. MILL, On Liberty! in JOHN STUART MILL, A SELECTION OF His WORKS 16-17
(Robson ed. 1966).
31. C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 6 (1977) ("[B]ackpack and
guitar case were symbols of rootlessness and therefore those carrying them were special
targets for recruitment.").
32. See, e.g., id. at 6-7.
1388 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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denying affiliation with the cult.3 3
The recruiting process is separated into a number of stages so that
even when the recruit gives consent, it is only to the next step in the
process.34 "The consequences of the final step are thus concealed until
the victim reaches the penultimate stage, at which time he has been
'softened up' to such a degree that committing his life and fortune to
the cult seems but a small step."35
II. Brainwashing and the First Amendment: Must They
Coexist?
Despite claims that cults practice brainwashing and that resultant
harms exist, the cults have claimed that their practices are not subject
to interference since they are protected by the first amendment.3 6
Parents have sought to deny this protection by contending that
cults are not "bona fide religious groups [but rather their] primary and
motivating purposes are economic and political gain."37 The defendants
33. See, e.g., id. at 27 ("[C]ult recruiters may carefully avoid or even deny that
the group is a religion.").
34. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("[R]ecruits rarely decide to become Moonies. They just
evolve into Moonies by putting off the decision.").
35. Delgado, supra note 6, at 55. See also, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 28
("This initial period of indcotrination may last up to five days, isolated from all outside
influences, and culminates in the new 'convert'. . . signing the 'Revolutionary Sheet'.
Here he agrees to turn over all his income, present and future, to the [Children of God]
and consents to have his mail opened.").
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, which provides that: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ..."
37. Rankin v. Howard, 527 F. Supp. 976, 977 (D. Ariz. 1981) ("[D]efendants
... contend that the Unification Church is not a bona fide religious group but that its
primary and motivating purposes are economic and political gain.").
This claim is not without factual substance however. As a result of an investiga-
tion into the activities of the Children of God by its Charity Frauds Bureau, the New
York Attorney General concluded that: "In view of the testimony. . ., one is led to the
irresistable presumption that fund gathering by Children of God is largely intended for
the personal gain of the leadership and for proselytizing new converts who in turn serve
as additional fund gatherers and contributors." FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
Nor is the Children of God the only cult this practice is associated with. "The
average Moonie takes in $50 to $200 a day; the more successful can make up to $500.
Every penny is turned in to the team leader who turns it over to the church." Rice,
supra note 3, at 24. See also, Kennedy & Kennedy, supra note 13, at 53 ("When I was
7
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made just such a contention about the Unification Church in the
deprogramming case of Rankin v. Howard.3 8 However, the court in
Rankin found United States v. Ballard9 controlling on this issue, and,
as such, held that "there can be no inquiry as to whether a religious
group is bona fide."'40 It was in Ballard, where Justice Douglas had
proclaimed:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact
that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that
they can be made suspect before the law.4
eighteen, I brought in $90,000 a year for my church, the Unification Church of Rev.
Sun Myung Moon.").
38. 527 F. Supp. 976.
39. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
40. Rankin, 527 F. Supp. at 978. But see, Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology
of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982), where a former member of the
church brought an action against it alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, breach of contract, violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, and a class action
for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The court said that "[a]lthough we agree that the Free Exercise Clause protects all
religions, old and new, alike once its protection attaches, in determining whether that
protection applies courts may require a newer faith to demonstrate that it is, in fact,
entitled to protection as a religion." Id. at 1144. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), where the Supreme Court found the application of Wisconsin's com-
pulsory education laws to Amish children beyond the eighth grade unconstitutional as a
violation of the first amendment's free exercise clause with F. & F. v. Duval County,
273 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973), where the Florida court found that a self-
ordained minister of the "Covenant Church of Jesus Christ" could not avoid the state
compulsory education laws by teaching his children at home. In Yoder, the court drew
attention to the fact that the Amish's "religious beliefs and what we would today call
'life style' have not altered in fundamentals for centuries." 406 U.S. at 205. In F. & F.
on the other hand, the Florida court found the fact that the church was not established
in Florida and the lack of the minister to hold services for anyone other than his chil-
dren to bear on the issue. 273 So. 2d at 18. See generally, Note, Toward a Constitu-
tional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978).
41. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87. Although Ballard prohibited examination of the
truth of one's beliefs, it did permit an examination into whether those beliefs were held
in good faith. As such, Ballard may be interpreted to allow a determination of whether
the cults are bona fide religious groups or economically and politically motivated.
8
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If, then, religion is subject to protection, and it is not open to ques-
tion whether these cults are religious, can anything be done to alleviate
the harms accruing from the brainwashing practices of the cults?
This question has recently faced a number of parents. Upon bal-
ancing a perceived harm to their children against the freedom of reli-
gion claim, many parents expend great sums of money to have their
children abducted and subjected to religious deprogramming. (
42. Deprogramming is a practice whereby the child is kidnapped, taken to a
motel room and then a marathon encounter ensues. Ted Patrick, the world-famous
deprogrammer, says: "Essentially it's just talk. I talk to the victim, for as long as I
have to." T. PATRICK with T. DULACK, LET OUR CHILDREN Go! 75 (1976). One of the
standard tools used for deprogramming is Chapter 22 in Robert Lifton's book, Thought
Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing (supra note 7)
since it "seems to be written about today's religious cult recruiting and indoctrination
practices instead of some far-off Oriental prison camp." C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra
note 31, at 172. Patrick also claims to make use of the Bible, putting passages the cults
took out of context back into context, forcing the child to "read the whole chapter from
where it was taken." T. PATRICK, supra, at 78.
Patrick does say that "[w]hen a victim is exceptionally vigorous, it may even mean
a measure of physical restraint," Id. at 75, but, "the child is rarely held in custody by
the parents and [Patrick] for longer than three days. Usually it takes Patrick less than
one day to deprogram a person. I've managed to do it on occasion in an hour." Id. at
76.
But see, LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 599 (1978), where he describes deprogramming in a much different light.
The deprogramming process begins with abduction. Often strong men
muscle the subject into a car and take him to a place where he is cut off
from everyone but his captors. He may be held against his will for
upwards of three weeks. Frequently, however, the initial deprogramming
only lasts a few days. The subject's sleep is limited and he is told that he
will not be released until his beliefs meet his captors' approval. Members
of the deprogramming group, as well as members of the family, come into
the room where the victim is being held and barrage him with questions
and denunciations until he has recanted his newly found religious beliefs.
Id. at 603-04. LeMoult says that deprogramming "is far more like 'brainwashing' than
the conversion process by which members join various sects." Id. at 606. He especially
draws attention to the sudden break that Patrick describes during a deprogramming
session (See T. PATRICK, supra at 79 ("the moment when that happens is always un-
mistakable"). Compare with F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra notes 23-26 and ac-
companying text.). Patrick counters "I do not brainwash. I ask questions, basically, and
I try to show the victim how he has been deceived. Whereas, in the cult indoctrination,
everything possible is done to prevent the person from thinking, in deprogramming I do
391 1Religious Deprogramming
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While a great many of these deprogrammings have freed members
from the grips of the cults, 43 many which have failed have ended in
litigation. In these cases, it has been the children who have brought suit
against their parents and deprogrammers, alleging both tort claims and
federal civil rights statute violations. These causes of action must be
resorted to because the first amendment requires state action, and ap-
plies only to Congress and the federal government, or to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4" Where
parents carry out the deprogramming themselves state action is clearly
lacking.45
Two recent parental deprogramming cases, both of which turned
on the court's belief in the validity of strikingly similar arguments,
have come down on opposite sides of the fence. Since the United States
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in both cases, it appears unlikely
that any uniformity will be developed in the near future.
The first of these cases, Ward v. Connor,46 upheld a complaint
everything I know how to start him thinking." T. PATRICK, supra, at 76.
43. Ted Patrick claims to have "deprogramm[ed] and arranged for deprogram-
ming of over one thousand Americans." T. PATRICK, supra note 42, at 37.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(free exercise clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment
clause).
45. This is not always true however. Where parents have been using guardian-
ships, there is significant involvement of the judiciary, which has been held to consti-
tute state action. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforce-
ment of a discriminatory restrictive covenant).
Where there has been an overstepping of judicial bounds, suits have been filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for discriminatory conspiracies under color of state law. See,
e.g., Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) (son sued parents and judge).
See also, Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Police officer knew of
kidnapping for deprogramming but did not take any action. "Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged state action in violation of § 1983 to sustain a cause of action against Defen-
dant police officers." Id. at 568). But see, Orlando v. Wizel, 443 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Ark. 1978) ("there is no contention that the parents and [professional deprogrammer]
'conspired' with the State Police or Judge, . . . A state, merely by providing a forum
and a means of enforcing regularly issued court orders, does not 'color' the action of
private litigants with state action." Id. at 748.).
46. 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 455 U.S. 907
(1982). For a complete discussion of Ward see Comment, Civil Rights: A Civil Rem-
edy for Religious Deprogramming Victim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 21 WASHBURN
L. J. 663 (1982).
10
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which alleged that parents are liable for conspiring to deprogram their
children under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).47 The second case, Peterson
v. Sorlien,48 found the parents of a member of The Way Ministry not
liable for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in their deprogramming attempt. Although the causes of action
are different, both cases turned on the level of credence the court gave
to the claim that the parents acted out of concern for the well-being of
their child.
In Ward, the court was confronted with 42 U.S.C. section
1985(3), the Ku Klux Klan Act. This statute was originally enacted in
47. This statute reads:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted au-
thorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or
more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citi-
zen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support to advocacy in
a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified
person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or prop-
erty on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set
forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (West 1981).
48. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). For a
complete discussion of Peterson see Comment, When parents, or their agents, acting
under the conviction that the judgmental capacity of their adult child is impaired,
seek to extricate that child from what they reasonably believe to be a religious or
pseudo-religious cult, and the child at some juncture assents to the actions in ques-
tion, limitations upon the child's mobility do not constitute meaningful deprivations of
personal liberty sufficient to support a judgment for false imprisonment-Peterson v.
Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1742 (1981), 30 EM-
ORY L.J. 959 (1981).
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1871 to stop Ku Klux Klan violence against the newly freed blacks4
but little attention was paid to it until 1971, when the case of Griffin v.
Breckenridge" found state action unnecessary, allowing the statute to
reach purely private conspiracies. To find liability the statute requires
that the defendants must have conspired for the purpose of depriving
the plaintiff "of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws."8 1 In order to give effect to section
1985(3) yet avoid interpreting it as a general federal tort law, Griffin
found the statute's language to require a showing of intent-that the
defendants acted out of some "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus. ' '52
To find a deprogramming attempt actionable under section
1985(3), it must be decided whether religious affiliation is the type of
class Griffin intended to protect. The Ward court, in deciding that reli-
gion was a protectable class, was confronted with a split of authority.
The trial court in Ward,58 which was reversed on appeal, had found
that the voluntary joining and leaving of a church did not result in the
requisite "discrete, insular and immutable characteristics,"" that are
49. See generally, Wildman, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)-A Private Action to Vindi-
cate Fourteenth Amendment Rights: A Paradox Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 317
(1980); Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c): A Sug-
gested Approach, 64 MINN. L. REV. 635 (1980); Comment, The Deprogramming of
Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section 1985(3), 74 N.W.
U. L. REV. 229 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Deprogramming of Reli-
gious Sect Members]; Comment, Civil Rights: A Civil Remedy for Religious
Deprogramming Victim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 21 WASHBURN L.J. 663 (1982);
Comment, Civil Rights: A Federal Remedy Against Private Class Discrimination
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)-Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), 47
WASH. L. REV. 353 (1972).
50. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Griffin upheld a complaint which allowed blacks from
Mississippi to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) from a group of white citizens for
allegedly conspiring to deprive them of the right to interstate travel, despite the ab-
sence of state action.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (West 1981).
52. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
53. Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 657 F.2d 45 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
54. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 437. This test was originally established in Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), arid, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.
1974), where the court denied relief for discrimination to a member of the Ku Klux
12
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inherent in classifications such as race, national origin and sex.5 This
point was expressly countered, however, in Baer v. Baer," another pa-
rental deprogramming case, where Judge Williams stated that:
While religious status may differ from racial status, because it
is not a congenital and inalterable trait, membership in a minority
religious group, like membership in a minority racial group, has
often excited the fear, hatred and irrationality of the majority. Two
thousand years of human history compellingly prove that no easier
road to martyrdom is found than in adherence to an unpopular reli-
gious faith.87
The Ward circuit court followed this approach and found religion
a protectable class," under section 1985(3). The mere fact, however,
that religion is protectable does not give rise to parental liability for
their deprogramming efforts. It must still be shown that the conspiracy
was the result of some "invidiously discriminatory animus"5° due to
membership in this type of religious class.60
Several trial courts, including the Ward district court, have found
this discriminatory animus clearly lacking since "[i]t is readily appar-
ent . . that defendants were motivated to act .. by their concern
for the well-being of a loved one.""1 These rulings were ignored by the
Klan who lost his job due to his affiliation with that group.
55. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 437.
56. 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
57. Id. at 491.
58. The Ward court based their decision primarily upon the legislative history to
the forerunner of § 1985(3), the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The court quoted Senator
Edmunds during the debates preceding that statute, where he said: "[I]f in a case like
this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because he was
a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Method-
ist .... then this section could reach it. Cong. Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Sess. 567
(1871)." Ward, 657 F.2d at 48.
59. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
60. Ward, 657 F.2d 45.
61. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 438. See also, Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717
(D.R.I. 1978) ("In fact, it was shown, and this Court finds, that Defendants' actions
were primarily, if not entirely, motivated by the maternal concerns of Plaintiff's
mother" Id. at 724.); Styn v. Styn, No. 79-3468, slip op. at - (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("There
is no invidiously discriminatory animus here. Defendants were motivated, not by their
395 1
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Ward circuit court, which ruled that "the complaint sufficiently
charge[d] that the defendants were motivated to act as they did not
only because they found the plaintiff's religious beliefs intolerable, but
also because of their animosity towards the members of the Unification
Church." '6
This dichotomy of whether parents' liability emanated from "their
concern for the well-being of a loved one"6 or "animosity toward the
members of the. . . church"" was settled in favor of a reasonableness
standard in a well-reasoned decision by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota. In that case, Peterson v. Sorlien,3 a member of The Way Minis-
try sued her parents for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of
emotional distress for their efforts in deprogramming her. The court
denied relief, choosing to establish a reasonableness standard, holding
that when parents or their agents, acting under the conviction that
dislike of a particular religious group, but by concern for the well-being of a family
member." Id. at _.).
Although speaking in the context of minor children and compulsory education law
the Supreme Court has commented that: "The history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
62. Ward, 657 F.2d at 49. This is in agreement with at least one commentator,
who has said:
The fact that the defendants are personally concerned about the plaintiff
does not destroy the class-based nature of their animus. There is no spe-
cific intent requirement in section 1985(3). Defendants may believe they
are doing good and actually helping the plaintiff. However, if their concern
is caused by a deep-seated hostility toward the plaintiff's chosen religion
and lifestyle, this seems the very essence of "class-based animus"--a stere-
otyped view of the class as having no constitutional rights, which inspires
the defendant to act illegally and unconstitutionally, as in Griffin.
Comment, The Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members, supra note 49, at 241.
But see, Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. at 724 ("[Plaintiff's] actions which resulted in
her combination with Defendants, arose not from her abhorrence of the Unification
Church per se, but rather arose directly from the solicitude which a mother holds for
her daughter's health and well-being.").
63. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 438.
64. Ward, 657 F.2d at 49.
65. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
14
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the judgmental capacity of their adult child is impaired, seek to
extricate that child from what they reasonably believe to be a reli-
gious or pseudo-religious cult, and the child at some [later] junc-
ture assents to the actions in question, limitations upon the child's
mobility do not constitute meaningful deprivations of personal lib-
erty sufficient to support a judgment of false imprisonment."8
If brainwashing is to be considered a "public wrong", and
deprogramming is necessary to rectify that "wrong", Peterson is per-
haps a reasonable rule which provides some relief from the problem.
Giving a license to kidnap and deprogram children, however, is a
potential "time bomb". The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this
in formulating Peterson, cautioning that "owing to the threat that
deprogramming poses to public order, we do not endorse self-help as a
preferred alternative. '67
Consider a hypothetical case in which parents kidnap their lesbian
daughter and have her raped in an effort to deprogram her of her sex-
ual preferences. 8 Although these parents would likely be found liable
under Peterson, the girl was still forced to go through a rape due to
what some parents would consider, a parental license to deprogram.
"Indeed, according to the Gospel of Mark, Jesus was a candidate for
'deprogramming' since his own family thought he was berserk and his
religious leaders said he was possessed of the devil."' 9
66. Peterson, 299 N.W.2d at 129. A very similar argument has been used to
plead a defense of necessity where the deprogrammer has been charged with kidnap-
ping. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976), where the dis-
trict court's rulings were held unreviewable because of double-jeopardy. In that case,
the district court found that a parent may legally kidnap an adult child for deprogram-
ming based upon necessity and: "[w]here parents are, as here, of the reasonable belief
that they were alone not physically capable of recapturing their daughter from existing,
imminent danger, then the defense of necessity transfers or transposes to the consti-
tuted agent, the person who acts upon their behalf under such conditions." Id. at 145.
But see, People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1981)
(necessity defense not allowed in the absence of a showing of an emergency situation
and that the agent reasonably believed a need for criminal action existed).
67. Peterson, 299 N.W.2d at 129.
68. Although this author has been told such a case has occurred, numerous hours
of research have proven fruitless in finding it.
69. H. Cox, Playing the Devil's Advocate, as it Were, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1977, at A25, col. 1.
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III. Must We Settle for a Reasonableness Standard? Some
Suggested Solutions
If the goal of solving the problems inherent in parental deprogram-
ming is to take the power of deciding whether to deprogram away from
parents, and put it in the hands of some other decision-making body,
then first amendment70 obstacles must be overcome. 71
The cults and their supporters claim that freedom to practice their
religion is protected by the first amendment. However, if brainwashing
is part of their religious practice, should it be similarly protected? The
Supreme Court has recognized that not everything associated with the
practice of a religion is constitutionally protected. Justice Roberts,
speaking for a majority of the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,7
wrote that "[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two con-
cepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject
to regulation for the benefit of society. '" 7 3
Commentaries have been critical of Peterson for this reason.
Taken to its logical extreme, . . . if Lutheran parents become upset that
their child has converted to Roman Catholicism and has entered a monas-
tery, the parents are justified in extricating the adult child. According to
Peterson, to avoid liability in such a case, the parents need only confine the
child, subject him or her to harangues and threats of commitment to
mental institutions or other manner of "persuasion", until the child
assents.
Comment, supra note 48, at 1004-05.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. The first amendment provides "that Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Id. Besides
applying to the federal government, these provisions have been found to apply to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as part of "[t]he
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that amendment. . . ." Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise clause). See also, Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause).
72. 310 U.S. 296.
73. Id. at 303-04. "Thus, religious operations that endanger public safety,
threaten disorder, endanger the health of a member, or drastically differ from societal
norms may be regulated or prohibited." Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp.
367, 372 (D.R.I. 1978), afid per curiam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1978). Accord, Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) ("The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
16
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If a state were to attempt to regulate brainwashing as religious
conduct, the regulation "must be so exercised as not, . . [to] unduly
. . . infringe the protected freedom."'I Although procedures could be
established to strike this delicate balance, there are those who find this
unlikely:
If the state were allowed to determine that proselytizing re-
sulting in conversion were really "brainwashing" it would be ques-
tioning the validity of a religious experience and thus, as a result,
the underlying validity of the religion. It would also be invading the
highly protected area of free speech. Such a determination would
violate the free exercise, establishment, and free speech clauses of
the first amendment.7 5
Since any deprogramming regulation will of necessity encroach upon
latter to ill health or death." Id. at 166-67.).
In Turner, it was alleged that brainwashing on the part of the Unification Church
arose to the level of involuntary servitude (for a complete discussion of this claim see
infra notes 121 through 144 and accompanying text). The court found that Cantwell
allowed examination of these claims in view of the fact that it "is unquestionably an
act which has a serious adverse effect upon one of the Church's followers and consti-
tutes conduct that violates the most fundamental tenets of both American society and
the United States Constitution." Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 372.
But can belief and action truly be separated? In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), where a challenge was made to that state's compulsory education laws, Chief
Justice Burger stated: "This case. . . does not become easier because respondents were
convicted for their 'actions' in refusing to send their children to the public high school;
in this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compart-
ments." Id. at 220. This language was later quoted in Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal.
App. 3d 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), an action to set aside five
conservatorship orders granted for religious deprogramming. The court said further:
"When [it] is asked to determine whether that change was induced by faith or by
coercive persuasion is it not investigating and questioning the validity of that faith?"
Id. at 987, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 255. "The total picture disclosed must be tested by princi-
ples applicable to the regulation of acts of religious organizations and their members."
Id. at 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
74. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
75. LeMoult, supra note 42, at 614. See also, Note, Conservatorships and Reli-
gious Cults: Divining A Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978) ("A
member relies on the sect leaders for guidance and follows their commands unquestion-
ingly due to a belief that the leaders articulate the will of God. That belief is inextrica-
bly bound up with the member's will and thought." Id. at 1283.).
399 1Religious Deprogramming17:1983
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some first amendment rights, it must be in furtherance of a compelling
state interest.70 The state has such an interest in promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.7 Deprogramming, in seeking to pro-
mote the mental health of brainwashed members by removing the ef-
fects of brainwashing, is just such an interest. Further, if brainwashing
has induced self-mutilation,7 8 murder79 and mass-suicide 0 can anyone
truly say that it is not in the states' interest to regulate such activity?
If governmental regulations were made applicable to deprogram-
ming, it would put the government in a position of forcing a person to
accept treatment against his will. Doesn't each individual, however,
have the right to do with his own body as he sees fit? While this right
does exist as part of the right to privacy,81 it is not absolute. 2 Since
76. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1962); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) ("[T]he state may abridge religious
practices only upon a demonstration that some compelling state interest outweighs the
defendants' interests in religious freedom." Id. at 718, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr.
at 71.).
77. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vacci-
nation laws). See also, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ("State's important, and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point in the light of
present medical knowledge is at approximately the end of the first trimester....
[F]rom and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health." Id. at 163.).
78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
79. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 27 ("I was told by an older member that if
my leaders told me to kill someone, I would have to kill someone." Id. at 33.).
80. Mathews, supra note 28 (Jonestown slayings).
81. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (mother has a right before
viability to decide whether to have an abortion); Guardianship of Roe, - Mass. ._, 421
N.W.2d 40 (1981) ("competent individual has the right to refuse ... treatment." Id.
at -, 421 N.W.2d at 51.); Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)
("[Constitutional right of privacy] is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to
decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions." Id. at 40, 355 A.2d 663.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Satz v. Perl-
mutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (competent terminal patient has
a right to refuse extraordinary treatment as part of his constitutional right of privacy),
approved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) ("[C]ompetent adult patient, with no minor
dependents, suffering from a terminal illness has the constitutional right to refuse or
discontinue extraordinary medical treatment where all effected family members con-
18
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this right has been held to be a fundamental one,83 however, a compel-
ling governmental interest must be shown before it can be intruded
upon. 4 Here too, this compelling interest is the promotion of the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
Since the claim of brainwashing assumes the person is unaware
he's been brainwashed, would such a person be in a position to decide if
he should be.treated by deprogramming to have this condition removed,
or is he incompetent to rationally reach such a decision? While incom-
petence is generally thought of as the result of age, disease or infir-
sent." Id. at 360.).
The privilege of privacy is extremely important for both the individual
and society. It is necessary for individuality and the consciousness of indi-
vidual choice in life. Without solitude, which allows one to know what he
thinks and feels, the individual cannot achieve more than a primitive sense
of self. Independence and personal strength, as well as the diversity of
thought that arises from nonconformity, are desirable traits in a social sys-
tem. They result in leadership and creative surges that are essential for
social progress. Moreover, by enabling an individual to maintain degrees of
intimacy and distance, privacy is an integral aspect of personal liberty,
freedom and dignity. It places the individual in control of his own destiny,
thus allowing him to maximize his own creativity and desires. The mean-
ing of love, trust, and friendship are enhanced when the individual is able
to make his own decisions. Privacy both promotes purity of individual deci-
sions regarding the nature of one's relationships and assures that these re-
lationships are maintained.
A. SLABY & L. TANCREDI, COLLUSION FOR CONFORMITY 34 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (after viability, state can pro-
scribe abortion); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood withdrawal to
analyze alcohol content despite verbal refusal); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(sterilization of inmates who have a hereditary form of insanity or imbecility); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination). But see, Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (compulsory stomach pumping to search for drugs
found violation of due process as "conduct that shocks the conscience" Id. at 172.).
83. See, e.g., Wade, 410 U.S. at 155; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) ("[The
freedom to care for one's health and person,] though fundamental, [is] likewise subject
to regulation on a showing of 'compelling state interest'." Id. at 213. (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
84. See, e.g., Wade, 410 U.S. 113. See also, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (fundamental right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (funda-
mental right to marry); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (freedom of
religion).
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mity, 85 can the physiological effects of brainwashing be much
different?86
The Supreme Court has held that to confine a non-dangerous
mental incompetent without treatment is unconstitutional as a violation
of due process.87 The Court has yet to determine, however, whether a
non-dangerous mental incompetent is denied due process if treated
against his will.
The United States Supreme Court was asked, in Mills v. Rogers,88
to determine whether "an involuntarily committed mental patient has a
constitutional right to refuse treatment ... -19 The Court vacated the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals9" and remanded the case for
further proceedings91 to determine what effect an intervening Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts opinion, Guardianship of Roe,92 might
have on the case.93 The Court's decision to remand was based upon the
fact that "it is distinctly possible that [the state] recognizes liberty in-
terests of persons adjudged incompetent that are broader than those
protected directly by the Constitution of the United States. 94 In re-
85. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982) ("When using
the terms 'mentally incompetent', 'incompetent' and 'incapable' . . , these are defined
as including one who is not adjudicated insane but, because of old age, disease, weak-
ness of mind or other reasons, is unable without assistance to adequately care for his
person or property and, therefore could be deceived by artful or designing persons." Id.
at 1351.), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3533 (Jan. 18, 1983). See generally 41 AM. JUR.
2D Incompetent Persons § 1-7 (1968).
86. But see, LeMoult, supra note 42. "One would search in vain to find 'brain-
washed zombies' listed in any of the standard texts on mental disorders." Id. at 630.
87. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Supreme Court has also
held that "[t]he mere fact that [a person] has been committed under proper procedures
does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982). "Respondent thus enjoys
constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasona-
bly non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by
these interests." Id. at 2463.
88. 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
89. Mills, at 2448.
90. Id. at 2452.
91. Id.
92. - Mass. -, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
93. Mills, at 2452.
94. Id. at 2450.
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gard to those rights protected by Massachusetts' laws, the Court found
this so "[e]specially in the wake of [Guardianship of Roe]." 5 As such,
it appears the Court is tacitly approving Guardianship of Roe as hav-
ing met at least minimal due process standards.
Guardianship of Roe involved the forcible treatment of a non-in-
stitutionalized incompetent with anti-psychotic drugs. The court began
their inquiry with the precept that "[a]bsent an overwhelming State
interest, a competent individual has the right to refuse ... treat-
ment." 96 The court held that this right was not lost due to incompe-
tence, but rather the question was: who may exercise it?
The court found the following factors to weigh heavily in its deci-
sion that "in order to accord proper respect to this basic right of all
individuals . . . a judicial determination of substituted judgment must
be sought." 97 A determination of substituted judgment would require
the courts to decide what "that" person would do if given the choice, as
opposed to the court deciding what they think "that" person should
do. 8 Those factors the court relied upon in reaching this decision were:
95. Id. at 2450.
96. Guardianship of Roe, at _, 421 N.E.2d at 51. While a competent individual
can refuse treatment, incompetent individuals have even been denied the opportunity to
consent in extreme situations. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42
U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty., Mich., July 31, 1973), where it was held that
"involuntarily detained mental patients cannot give informed and adequate consent to
experimental psychosurgical procedures on the brain." Id. at 2064.
97. Guardianship of Roe, at _, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52.
98. The Massachusetts court
emphasize[d] that, the determination is not what is medically in the
ward's best interests-a determination better left to those with extensive
medical training and experience. The determination of what the incompe-
tent individual would do if competent will probe the incompetent individ-
ual's values and preferences and such an inquiry in a case involving anti-
psychotic drugs is best made in courts of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at 52 (emphasis original). But see, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982)
("[T]here certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than ap-
prorpriate professionals in making [treatment] decisions." Id. at 2462.).
This dichotomy has been exemplified by the terminally ill "right to die" cases. In
Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), the highly publicized case where
a 22 year old girl, Karen Quinlan, was in a comatose state and her parents sought to
have her removed from a life supporting respirator, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held:
403 I117:1983
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"(1) the intrusiveness of the proposed treatment, (2) the possibility of
adverse side effects, (3) the absence of an emergency, (4) the nature
and extent of prior judicial involvement, and (5) the likelihood of con-
flicting interests."9 9 Applying these factors to religious deprogramming,
we see that: the intrusions to both liberty and first amendment freedom
of religion are great; 100 there is a substantial possibility of harm if the
wrong person is deprogrammed since deprogramming is trying to effect
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the
responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possi-
bility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a
cognitive, sapient state and that the life-support apparatus now being ad-
ministered to Karen should be discontinued, they shall consult with the
hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the institution in which Karen
is then hospitalized. If that consultative body agrees that there is no rea-
sonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may
be withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal liabil-
ity therefor on the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician,
hospital or others.
Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. But see, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), where the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts rejected the Quinlan "Ethics Committee" approach, taking "a dim
view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the
duly established courts of proper jurisdiction. . . ." Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. The
court went further, saying that "such questions . . . require the process of detached
but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial
branch of government was created." Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. As such, the court
held a judicial determination of substituted judgment was necessary.
99. Guardianship of Roe, at -, 421 N.E.2d at 52. The court gave a number of
additional factors which also were considered:
Among them are at least the following: the extent of impairment of the
patient's mental faculties, whether the patient is in the custody of a State
institution, the prognosis with the proposed treatment, the complexity, risk
and novelty of the proposed treatment, its possible side effects, the pa-
tient's level of understanding and probable reaction, the urgency of deci-
sion, the consent of the patient, spouse, or guardian, the good faith of those
who participate in the decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to
what is good medical practice, the interests of third persons, and the ad-
ministrative requirements of any institution involved.
Id. (quoting Matter of Spring, - Mass. -, 405 N.E.2d 115, 121 (1980)).
100. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts (first amendment);
and notes 81-103 and accompanying text (liberty).
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thought processes and holographic patterns of the brain;101 deprogram-
ming does not arise in an emergency setting since members have usu-
ally been with the cult for a period of time;10 2 and finally, conflicting
interests such as freedom of religion are great.103 Consequently, it
seems likely that, for decisions determining whether to deprogram, the
criteria set forth in Guardianship of Roe would require a judicial de-
termination of substituted judgment. The court in Guardianship of
Roe, however, did not decide that anyone could be treated where a
judicial determination was made. In that case, a guardian had previ-
ously been appointed so that there was already an adjudication of
incompetence.
Guardianship Statutes
The application of guardianship statutes to deprogramming has
been advocated by many.10 ' This approach permits parents to petition a
court to be appointed as guardians for deprogramming purposes and
the court can then determine what, if any, treatment should take place.
The success of obtaining court appointed guardianships, however, var-
ies because different states require different standards of incompetence
to be met before a guardian will be appointed.
This was exemplified in two recent cases. In California, the case of
Katz v. Superior Court0 5 overturned the trial court's orders which had
granted guardianships to the parents of five members of the Unification
Church for deprogramming purposes. The court found that under the
applicable state statutes, "in the absence of such actions as render the
adult believer himself gravely disabled . . . , the processes of this state
101. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, _, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276,
282 (Ct. App. 1981) (Necessity defense was not allowed in the absence of an emer-
gency. "After some seven years of alleged cult membership, any imminent harm
threatening [the member], if it existed at all, was of a character not justifying the
violent action undertaken by the [Parents] with Patrick's help.").
103. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts.
104. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6, at 88. In California, guardianship orders
were obtained for five members of the Unification Church, although they were later set
aside. See Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (lst Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
105. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234.
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cannot be used to deprive the believer of his freedom of action and to
subject him to involuntary treatment."' 06
In Oklahoma, where the standard to be applied is whether "the
alleged incompetent is incapable of 'taking care of himself and manag-
ing his own property', '1 0 7 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Tay-
lor v. Gilmartin,0 8 found the issuance of conservatorship orders to par-
ents for deprogramming improper. In that case, it was the failure to
follow proper procedure and to produce evidence showing incompetency
which were at fault. It is entirely possible that if these circumstances
were different, the conservatorship would have been upheld.
If a state does not have a guardianship statute applicable to
deprogramming, its legislature should consider enacting one. Despite
the obstacles posed by the first amendment 0 9 and the due process
clause's right to refuse treatment,"10 a deprogramming statute would be
less intrusive than allowing parents to engage in self-help"' and less
offensive than requiring a brainwashed person to remain that way.
If such a statute were enacted, procedural safeguards must be in-
cluded so that it would not violate due process. Although "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands,"" 2
[w]hen the state participates in deprivation of a person's right to
personal liberty. . . . at a minimum, due process requires that the
person receive a hearing after adequate written notice of the basis
for the proposed action; an opportunity to appear in person and to
present evidence in his own behalf; the right to confrontation by,
and the opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses; a neutral
and detached decision maker; findings by a preponderance of the
evidence and a record of the proceeding adequate to permit mean-
ingful judicial or appellate review." 3
106. Id. at 988-89, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
107. Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3533 (Jan. 18, 1983).
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts.
110. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
113. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 937-38, 569 P.2d 1286, 1296, 141 Cal.
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/6
Religious Deprogramming
7:1983
These safeguards are in line with the goals a deprogramming stat-
ute would seek to achieve-the undoing of unconsensual brainwashing
and minimal intrusiveness to personal liberty.
At the proceedings, the judge questions the victim, observes his de-
meanor and hears psychiatric testimony. If conservatorship orders
issue, they spell out the powers of the parent or conservator, includ-
ing the location and type of any treatment to be given. The treat-
ment proceeds, under the supervision of the court, which may ques-
tion the treating physician, observe progress or order the treatment
discontinued.1 1 4
In Guardianship of Roe, the Massachusetts court recognized the
serious impact of deciding whether to treat a person against his will.
The court therefore "set forth . . . guidelines to be followed in order to
"1115ensure accuracy and consistency in [such] proceedings ... .
(1) The ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment ...
Even if the ward lacks capacity to make treatment decisions, his
stated preference is entitled to serious consideration....
Rptr. 298, 308 (1977). See also, Guardianship of Roe, - Mass. 421 N.E.2d 40,
47 (1981) ("[P]reponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard to
be applied ... a conscientious judge, being mindful of the adverse social consequences
which might follow an adjudication of mental illness, will subject an individual to
guardianship only after carefully considering the evidence and indicating those factors
that persuade him."). But see, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil involun-
tary commitment for an indefinite period of time requires "clear and convincing" level
of proof).
114. Delgado, supra note 6, at 91.
115. Guardianship of Roe, at_, 421 N.E.2d at 61. Such guidelines are necessary
considering the implications of extraordinary treatment:
The awesome moral problem of these treatments is confused by the
fact that the individuals so treated may in most cases be incapable of ob-
jecting to the treatment after it has occurred. In his altered state, the pa-
tient is pleasant and happy; he has no recollection of his prior condition
and is therefore incapable of asserting any objections he might have to the
treatment, be they physical, philosophical, or recalcitrant. The new person-
ality is reformed and even artificial, almost as if a new soul had been
transplanted into an old body.
N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 388 (1971).
407 1
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(2) The ward's religious beliefs....
(3) The impact upon the ward's family ....
(4) The probability of adverse side effects ....
(5) The consequences if treatment is refused ...
(6) The prognosis with treatment...
These factors should facilitate deprogramming efforts while
prohibiting society from imposing upon both religious rights protected
by the first amendment and the member's right to privacy. "In short, if
an individual would, if competent, make an unwise or foolish decision,
the judge must respect that decision as long as he would accept the
same decision if made by a competent individual in the same
circumstances.
1 1 7
Despite such procedural safeguards, deceptive practices of the
cults might render any action impossible. In view of these deceptive
practices, the deliberate hiding of members from their parents118 and
the total disregard of the law by some of the cults,119 many advocate an
ex-parte hearing to ensure that guardianship orders are issued. Consid-
ering the intrusions of an ex-parte order to personal liberty it is recom-
mended that a two-stage proceeding be adopted. The first stage could
116. Guardianship of Roe, at -, 421 N.E.2d at 57-58.
117. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 60 n.20.
118. One ex-member of the Children of God has testified:
They then persuaded me to hide in another loft next door... I heard
my parents come up and I heard them scream and everything and the cops
came-and I stayed there until my parents left the building. . .I heard
my mother asking Abram and Ruth where I was and Abram denied my
presence at the Children of God and stated I left the Children of God and
they did not know where I was.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 22-23 ("Our files are replete with the testimony of
parents and ex-members of similar incidents." Id. at 23.).
119. For instance, a "Moses Letter" entitled "Public Relations" which is used by
the Children of God for leadership training, proclaimed: "You can ask to see the war-
rant-make sure who it's for, and while you are stalling, someone else can inform the
disciple involved who then has a perfect right to run out the back door if he wants to."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.
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be a "probable cause" ex-parte hearing to bring the member within the
jurisdiction of the court. The cults could then be legally compelled to
produce the member at the second stage. It is at this second-stage pro-
ceeding where the court can determine if guardianship orders shall be
issued. If the court does issue such orders, then a later additional pro-
ceeding would be required, after all the evidence is in, to determine
whether to permit the deprogramming.
In view of the fact that "due process is flexible" 120 and depends
upon the situation, an initial ex-parte hearing to confer jurisdiction
should not be violative. The state interests in alleviating brainwashing
and thereby promoting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens
should substantially outweigh the inconvenience that would accrue to a
member not in need of deprogramming by making him appear in
court.
121
120. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
121. Such a balancing of interests is the test usually applied to procedural due
process questions. The test was given in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
Id. at 335. This language was later quoted in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) and Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
In Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Penn. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S.
119 (1976), a balancing of state against individual interests led the court to mandate a
civil probable cause hearing within 72 hours of commitment of minors. While the case
was vacated as moot, due to an intervening legislative change, a similar balancing of
interests should permit the court to take jurisdiction before a decision of whether to
deprogram is made.
Such a system has already been used for deprogramming. See Religious Cults
Newest Magnet for Youth, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, June 14, 1976, at 52
("On at least one occasion, sheriff's deputies have gone out in the pre-dawn hours to
pick up the person, so the commune does not have time to spirit him away." Id. at 54.).
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Thirteenth Amendment's Slavery Prohibitions
A blanket approach might be developed to effectively prevent
brainwashing. As a result of a Grand Jury investigation, the People of
the State of New York, in People v. Murphy,2 2 charged two leaders of
the Hare Krishna movement with unlawful imprisonment. The basis
for this charge was that:
through "mind control", brainwashing, and/or "manipulation of
mental processes" the defendants destroyed the free will of the al-
leged victims, obtaining over them mind control to the point of ab-
solute domination .... 123
While the charge was dismissed "on the ground of insufficient le-
gal evidence" 124 it is possible that the argument was proper but that
instead of unlawful imprisonment, the charge should have been thir-
teenth amendment slavery violations.1 25
If the New York District Attorney, and others, are correct in
claiming that brainwashing gives such "control to the point of absolute
domination" 12 6-is this not slavery? Compare this basis for the New
York case with the modern definition of slavery given in United States
v. Ingalls:1 27
A slave is a person who is wholly subject to the will of another, one
who has no freedom of action and whose person and services are
wholly under the control of another and who is in a state of com-
pulsory service to another. 128
Professor Richard Delgado has found a number of similarities be-
tween the cults' practices and those practices which previous courts
122. 98 Misc. 2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
123. Id. at 239-40, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
124. Id. at 243, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, which provides that: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime . . . , shall exist within the
United States. . . ." Id. For a complete discussion of this claim, see Delgado, Reli-
gious Totalism As Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51 (1980).
126. Murphy, at 239-40, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
127. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
128. Id. at 78.
410 Nova Law Journal
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have found give rise to a thirteenth amendment claim. For example,
Cultists often are recruited by force and deception, then removed
to isolated surroundings from which escape is difficult .... Doubts,
"improper" thoughts, or insufficient fund-raising may be punished
by forcing the recruit to "pay indemnity" and undergo physical
self-mortification....
...Work assignments are made by the leaders, who control
every detail of the convert's life, including residence, meals, hours
of sleep, even choice of marital partner .... Recruits work 12-14
hour work days, seven days a week. All the proceeds are turned
over to the cult leaders .... 1'9
Courts have found combinations of the following practices to constitute
slavery: maintaining farm and field hands with little chance of escape
by charging exorbitant expense charges for food and rent which were
set against their pay,'13 0 threatening to disclose a thirty-eight year old
morals charge to authorities,' 31 threatening violence, 132 insufficient
food, 33 and long hours.' 3
It is clear that at least for involuntary servitude, "the law takes no
account of the means of coercion,"11 5 so that brainwashing, if suffi-
ciently proven, may well be enough to constitute slavery. If this charge
129. Delgado, supra note 125, at 58-59.
130. See United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bibb, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
131. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. at 77 (defendant threatened to have slave committed to
prison because of adultery and an abortion 38 years ago).
132. Bibb, 564 F.2d at 1168 ("Each victim testified that he did not leave Ivory
Lee Wilson's employ because he feared that he would be physically harmed by the
defendants."). See Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (defendants were severely beaten).
133. Bibb, 564 F.2d at 1168 ("There is evidence that the food furnish~l to her
by defendant was of substantially lower standard than that common to servants
generally.").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1167-68 ("Various combinations of physical violence and of threats of
physical violence for escape attempts are sufficient"); Bernal v. United States, 241 F.
339 (5th Cir. 1917) ("The law takes no account of the amount of the debt or the
means of coercion." Id. at 342.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918); Pierce v. United
States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945), reh'g denied,
157 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 814 (1947).
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of slavery were to be accepted, the cult could not claim protection of its
practices by the first amendment. In Turner v. Unification Church,136
the Unification Church made just such a claim in defense of an ex-
member's charge of involuntary servitude. The court responded:
The alleged involuntary servitude is unquestionably an act which
has a serious adverse effect upon one of the church's followers and
constitutes conduct that violates the most fundamental tenets of
both American society and the United States Constitution. The
Unification Church cannot seek the protection of one constitutional
amendment while it allegedly deprives citizens the protection of
other constitutional guarantees.137
The plaintiff's claim was eventually dismissed, as a claim upon
which relief could not be granted.138 The problem was that rather than
asking to be released from a state of involuntary servitude, the plaintiff
asked for damages for a previously terminated servitudal relationship.
Professor Delgado, who originally espoused use of a thirteenth
amendment claim, found the amendment's categorical approach most
appealing. "[I]f a particular practice constitutes slavery, it is prohib-
ited,"1 9 so that, "one need not show that the slaves are unhealthy, in-
competent, or in danger of becoming insane; it is enough to show that
they are slaves."' 40 While this approach provides an easy method to
attack brainwashing, and therefore the cults, it completely overlooks
the individual's right to privacy and his first amendment right to freely
practice the religion of his choice.
Moreover, the claim that mind control is a form of slavery under
the thirteenth amendment is based upon the supposition that brain-
washing, a psychological concept, renders the victim subject to the
master's control. To use Delgado's theory that we no longer have to
show incompetency or unhealthiness due to the thirteenth amendment's
categorical approach would be to use flawed reasoning. This is so be-
cause brainwashing presupposes incompetency or lack of health. Were
136. 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978).
137. Id. at 372.
138. Id. at 375-76.
139. Delgado, supra note 125, at 53.
140. Id. at 55.
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it otherwise, we could not explain how the slaves were compelled to be
slaves since there was no physical compulsion.
Professor Delgado seeks use of the thirteen amendment to effectu-
ate his own ideals. As he himself writes: "The thirteenth amendment's
prohibition of human bondage offers a method by which our instinctive
reaction to such cases can be made legally cognizable. Our intuitions
should respond to fundamental notions about the way in which we, as a
society, wish to live. We do not want slavery."141 Although we do not
want the cults to use brainwashing techniques, can we allow our intu-
itions to get the better of us? We must respect the first amendment
freedoms14 2 and the individual's right to privacy.1 43 While brain-
washing will not be protected under either of these constitutional guar-
antees, the Constitution demands that this brainwashing be fully
proven before we send a "lynch mob" after the cults.
Instead of seeking to use the thirteenth amendment in a vacuum to
rectify brainwashing by the cults, it seems far more palatable to use the
policies against slavery as a further compelling state interest to over-
come both the first amendment and right to privacy obstacles in using
guardianship-type statutes, thus more fully protecting individual
freedoms.
Present remedies have proven insufficient to prevent the use of
brainwashing techniques and have only provided relief after the fact. If
claims of slavery are proven the thirteenth amendment's enforcement
statutes144 provide penal sanctions which should deter cults from using
such techniques in the future, thus buttressing the guardianship and
deprogramming post hoc solutions.
Conclusion
There is persuasive evidence that religious cults brainwash their
members. This, combined with deception in the recruiting phase, raises
a strong doubt as to whether these members are exercising their free
will. This brainwashing may actually constitute a form of slavery.
Parents, distressed over seeing their loved ones in such a state, find
141. Id. at 61.
142. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts.
143. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
144. These include 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1581-87 (West 1976).
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themselves in a dilemma. Should they take action on their own, at-
tempting a rescue, or should they stand idly by as their child deterio-
rates? A number of parents have chosen self-help, kidnapping and
deprogramming their children at the risk of being held liable for de-
priving their child of his civil rights.
Recognizing the parents' dilemma, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota adopted a reasonableness standard, under which parents cannot
unconditionally kidnap their children. The parents, to avoid liability,
must have acted upon a reasonable belief that deprogramming was nec-
essary. In view of the child's civil rights, and the fact that parents are
unlikely to be able to objectively evaluate whether their actions are rea-
sonable, it is far better to take the power to decide such a course of
action from the parent and vest it in the judiciary. The court can weigh
all sides and the child is provided the opportunity to be heard. If the
court does determine that deprogramming will take place, it will set the
parameters. This can best be effectuated through use of guardianship-
type statutes. Moreover the thirteenth amendment's enforcement stat-
utes can provide penal sanctions against cult leaders if slavery by
brainwashing is proven.
Ira Jason Schacter
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